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Primary resistance to globalization today has been directed at economic and market forces, but it also has found voice in claims that globalization imposes Western or American cultural, legal, and political values on other cultures. Resistance to globalization, whether through terrorist violence like that directed at the World Trade Center in 2001, or through increasingly oppressive immigration and detention policies directed against noncitizens, 2 is unlikely to prevent the continuing development of a global order. The United States has a strong interest in facilitating that development and ensuring that a global order incorporates a strong commitment to human rights. Because it is a powerful country-at times too much a Caesar-American efforts to shape globalization 316 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:315 are likely to be accompanied by claims that the United States merely seeks to impose its own values on the world community. It is difficult to distinguish between policies and practices that "impose" values on unwilling cultures, and policies and practices that foster communication, consensus, and adherence to particular values. However, characterizing efforts to develop communication and consensus on national and global adherence to human rights norms as "imposition" of values, serves only to frustrate communication and change. One value commonly perceived to be at variance between Western and other cultures is gender equality. The extent to which adherence to gender equality represents a variance between cultures is best acknowledged so that emergence of an international world order is accompanied by adequate safeguards to ensure compliance at national and global levels with norms of gender equality. One method of promoting and facilitating greater understanding and consensus on gender equality as part of an international legal world order is continual consideration of international legal norms in constitutional adjudication. The United States may be less like Caesar if in developing national constitutional norms it considers issues that have global dimensions within a global context.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg is one jurist willing to pursue this approach. It is, of course, appropriate to consider Justice Ginsburg's decisions in the context of gender equality, for her legacy is well known and well regarded. 3 For some years now, Justice Ginsburg's work has illustrated an awareness that our place in the global order requires consideration of international norms and practice in the formulation of our own national norms. 4 Future discussions of how globalization should or may be shaped must include a guarantee of gender equality that transcends national, religious, and cultural borders. Acknowledging our own missteps in accepting gender equality as a norm, and placing our legal developments in the global context may help build consensus and acceptance of gender equality throughout the world community. I explore three ideas in this article.
First, the United States Supreme Court's decisions in citizenship cases fail to articulate a clear and coherent concept of citizen- [Vol. 7:315 tion or detention, citizenship may mean everything, including the right to live in the country where one has been raised, and the right to be close to the only family one has known.
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In describing the interplay between the Supreme Court's development of a constitutional norm on gender and citizenship, I explore cases involving acquisition or loss of citizenship, the context in which the Court has most often developed constitutional norms of citizenship. 13 The Court's concept of citizenship, however, is informed by other factual contexts. Some of those contexts are helpful in coming to an understanding of the Court's vision of citizenship and gender. Thus, I consider cases in which the Court has decided a claim of sex discrimination, whether implicitly or explicitly, and in which some aspect of citizenship is discussed or is material to the resolution of the case.
14 I include cases that deal with gender and with activities that are viewed today as activities available only to citizens, like voting and the ability to reside in one's country, which is another way to describe freedom from deportation.
Second, I explore the idea that American adherence to norms of gender equality is inconsistent and remains in flux. This theme is developed by examining Supreme Court decisions on gender discrimination in the context of citizenship. These decisions reflect the tensions and discordant views of gender equality that continue to dominate global and national views about gender and the proper role of women and men in transmitting or constructing citizenship in national or transnational societies. Notwithstanding a well developed legal structure to combat gender discrimination in minimal process on the grounds that she had been found in a house of prostitution); Yeung How v. North, 223 U.S. 705 (1912) . 12 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) ; Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) ; see also U. S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) . 13 Nguyen, 533 U.S. 53; Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971) ; Mackenzie, 239 U.S. at 299. Other cases deal directly with acquisition or loss of citizenship. See, e.g., Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967) (holding that Congress lacks power to involuntarily divest a person of her or his United States citizenship); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964) (holding that a statute providing that a naturalized citizen loses her or his citizenship after continuous residence for three years in her or his country of origin violates the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause); Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939) (holding that a child born in the United States of alien parents is a U.S. citizen and is not subject to deportation because her parents had taken her from the United States to Sweden as a child where she resided until reaching the age of majority); Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 649 (holding that the detention of and exclusion from the United States of an adult born in United States of Chinese parents is unwarranted because he is a citizen of the United States). 14 See U. S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) 16 the case in which a majority of the Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute challenged in Miller. 17 These cases make clear that in the context of American society, stereotypes about sexual behavior, maternity, paternity, and parenting, in turn influenced by stereotypes about class, race, and ethnicity, remain primary stumbling blocks to substantive gender equality as well as to a comprehensive and consistent view of citizenship.
Third, globalization is defined as the emergence and continued development of an international world order. Globalization in one sense is a tautology. It merely describes the interrelatedness and interdependence of the earth and its organisms. Formal recognition, whether voluntary or involuntary, of this interdependence is inevitable. Globalization, however, does not eliminate difference. Differences are an inherent aspect of humanity. Differences are an inherent part of the American legal system and of American society, which has, since its founding, perceived itself at least in part as a heterogeneous society. At least two constitutional principles support the view that America, since its founding, is a heterogeneous society: the First Amendment, which implicitly acknowledges diversity of thought, speech and religion; 18 and federalism, which implicitly recognizes variance among states and local communities.
19
Tolerance for difference, necessary for a heterogeneous society to thrive, cannot allow differences to subvert basic human rights. Slavery serves as an example of the extent to which tolerance may accommodate differences. Such oppression is inconsistent with a free and just society.
Globalization poses potent challenges to strong and continued adherence to norms of gender equality. 20 22 In the United States, for example, sexual harassment and gender discrimination occur frequently in the workplace and labor statistics reveal a substantial wage differential between women and men. 23 Sexual harassment and assault remain a serious problem in educational institutions.
24
Although women are a slight majority of the population in the United States, women still continue to be underrepresented in leadership positions in the corporate world, in the professional world and in the political world. 25 Minimal representation on enticontends, the difficulties inherent in examining cultural differences on gender are substantial; it may be that different approaches to gender bias may be better studied by reference to religion, the nation-state or to a regional community. Nov. 12, 1999, at B4; Judy Mann, Pay Discrimination Is No Dirty Little Secret, WASH. POST, June 15, 2001, at C8; Joseph Menn, First Woman Named to Lead Blue-Chip Firm, L.A. TIMES, July 20, 1999, at ties such as the U.S. Supreme Court is accepted as sufficient. 26 I further explore this theme by reference to the modern Greek experience and response to gender bias. Stereotypical views of the sexes are changing and events or developments have a way of outdistancing views and attitudes; still, it clearly is a mistake to view the world as wholeheartedly endorsing the idea that the sexes are entitled to equality of treatment and opportunity, and that this equality of treatment is enforceable by law.
One aspect of tracking the growth of an emerging global legal order is the degree to which the Court considers international norms, decisions of international tribunals, or other nations' legal norms. The Supreme Court's reliance on international norms is sporadic and inconsistent. Although international conventions endorse and support gender-equality norms, 27 reliance on international norms on the issue of gender is problematic because actual international practice is inconsistent or at least in substantial variance to the values expressed in conventions and treaties. In addition, international conventions contain provisions that allow states to derogate or ignore their obligations in times of emergency or for elusive and flexible concepts such as "morality" or "public order." 28 Moreover, in the past, the Supreme Court has looked to NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:315 international norms in developing legal norms that allowed unbridled governmental actions and discrimination of disfavored classes, for example, women or resident aliens. 29 At other times, the Court has noted other nations' legal norms to more sharply delineate them from our own. 30 Recently, some Justices have turned to international law and international practice in developing American constitutional norms.
31 Justice Ginsburg, in particular, has placed what tends to be discussed in the literature as a national subjectrace discrimination and affirmative action-in the global context.
Formal recognition and discussion of international law and the practices of other nations furthers our own ability to comprehend and develop our own legal institutions, processes, and norms. International norms and the actual practices of other countries serve not just as a barometer of global opinion but may serve also as a caution or warning of the tenuousness of that norm in the global order. Discussion of issues like citizenship, race and gender in their global context, rather than exclusively in their national of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedom of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 29 (2) context, may yield a richer font of approaches and solutions; it may also help build consensus. Moreover, issues like citizenship are inherently international and global. Citizenship is important because national and international legal norms make it important. To discuss citizenship and its meaning in isolation from the global context is to ignore its role in the international order. These are functions that have been acknowledged by the Court in the past and which justify continued reference to international norms and the practice of nations.
Citizenship is particularly suited to study in reference to globalization and gender because the relationship established by citizenship is at the heart of the modern nation-state. International and other nations' citizenship norms share the sex bias of the United States.
32 Thus, the international construction of citizenship reflected the traditional and stereotypical understanding of the role that men and women were to play in society. Citizenship continues to be central to developing transnational or regional arrangements like the European Union. Thus, it is informed and constructed by reference to international law. Citizenship, moreover, is likely to be affected by globalization in the years to come. The concept of global citizenship does not appear as unattainable as it may have during the twentieth century. 33 Because citizenship continues to be influenced by gender, discussions of global citizenship should explore its role in norms of citizenship.
34
In this article, I first discuss the Supreme Court's treatment of gender discrimination in the context of citizenship in the past. Then, I explore two visions of citizenship reflected in the two most recent Court decisions exploring the constitutionality of intentional gender discrimination, one of which was authored by Justice Ginsburg. Finally, I discuss Justice Ginsburg's use of international law in the development of constitutional law norms, and I urge its expansion in application as an appropriate model for continued international dialogue on gender and citizenship, in particular, and in human rights law, in general. The Court's logic reflected the plain language of the amendment-" [t] here is no doubt that women may be citizens." 40 The Court reasoned that citizenship as a concept predated adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. Citizenship, thus, was something possessed by the people who were members of a political community. Women were persons, the Court noted, and, thus, the mere fact that they were women did not preclude them from membership in the political community. 41 In exploring what "citizens" or "citizenship" might mean, the Court saw it grounded squarely on membership in a political community.
There cannot be a nation without a people. The very idea of a political community, such as a nation is, implies an association of persons for the promotion of their general welfare. Each one of the persons associated becomes a member of the nation 35 
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formed by the association. He owes it allegiance and is entitled to its protection. Allegiance and protection are, in this connection, reciprocal obligations. . . .
[citizen] is understood as conveying the idea of membership of a nation, and nothing more.
42
The Court's focus on membership in a political community to define citizenship might have, if developed, led the Court to a meaningful concept of citizenship. As that "and nothing more" indicated, however, the Court's understanding of what membership in a political community might mean or require was crabbed for it did not require that Virginia Minor be allowed to vote. Suffrage, according to this 1875 Court, was not one of the "privileges and immunities of citizenship."
43
The Court's decision rested primarily on historical practice and is consistent with other post-Reconstruction cases interpreting the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as a nullity. 44 Suffrage, it noted, had been restricted since the founding of the republic; all states restricted suffrage to white males of certain ages and some states restricted suffrage to only white, male, property owners. 45 Moreover, the Court reasoned that citizenship was not necessary to suffrage, as a number of states allowed noncitizen males to vote. 46 Therefore, according to this Court, there seemed to be little link between suffrage and citizenship or membership in a political community. The Court saw itself bound by historical practice despite the grand break with history the nation as a whole had witnessed in the Civil War, during Reconstruction, and passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.
For nearly ninety years the people have acted upon the idea that the Constitution, when it conferred citizenship, did not necessarily confer the right of suffrage. If uniform practice long continued can settle the construction of so important an instrument as the Constitution of the United States confessedly is, most certainly it has been done here. [Vol. 7:315 tains no reference to the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, nor does it consider or discuss how differences in sex roles typical of the late 1800s might be related to or affect citizenship and the right to vote. Virginia Minor's own family, her role in the family as an educator and primary caretaker of her children, and therefore perhaps responsible for the passing of values to her children, is not considered relevant to her status as citizen. 48 The Court speaks briefly about allegiance and protection, but leaves these terms undefined. Similarly, the Court fails to explain how Virginia Minor, as a citizen, is to express her allegiance. Allegiance, for this Court, appears to be an attitude rather than a value requiring some recognition of rights and duties or responsibilities.
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In the United States, citizens have no obligation under the law to vote. A substantial number of United States citizens never vote, even in national elections. 49 Thus, perhaps the Minor view that citizenship as a practical matter is disconnected from the franchise is an accurate view. Of course, there is a vast difference between a citizen who chooses not to vote, and a citizen who is prohibited from voting. Notwithstanding the Court's view of the relationship between citizenship and suffrage is likely consistent with the understanding of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. 50 That same Congress adopted the Fifteenth Amendment securing the vote to all male citizens. 51 Leaders of the women's movement resisted adoption of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments because the amendments did not prohibit denial of the franchise to women.
52 The Court's view of history is not inaccurate; but this is simply not a Court willing to look to social or political developments for an understanding of what the Constitution may require. The opinion is reminiscent of the Dred Scott decision in its homage to federalism, state powers, and its understanding of citizenship. 
2004]
REAL DIFFERENCES AND STEREOTYPES 327
citizenship in states; if citizenship is to be shared by women, then citizenship will secure few rights, privileges or immunities. The Court's concept of citizenship in Minor is singularly void of substance. To this late nineteenth century court, citizenship means membership in a political community. Membership, however, involves or requires only silent allegiance to the political community from the member, not active participation in the legislative and political processes. As a member, the citizen receives protection, but it is not clear from whom or from what. Neither the concept of allegiance nor protection are delineated or developed by the Court in any depth. The Court's construction of citizenship may have been affected by the need to develop a theory of citizenship that allowed state and federal legislatures to continue to freely discriminate on the basis of sex.
Forty-one years later, the Court remained constrained in its concept of citizenship and of gender equality. In Mackenzie v. Hare, the Court upheld a statute that divested American women, but not men, of their United States citizenship upon marriage to foreign nationals without the individual citizen's consent. 54 Mackenzie, like Minor, raised the issue of gender equality in the context of voting. The case came to the Court in an interesting posture because it involved divestiture of citizenship from a person who continued to reside in the United States after her marriage. 55 Ethel Mackenzie was born in California and met and married Gordon Mackenzie, a citizen of Great Britain, in California.
56 Both Ethel and Gordon Mackenzie resided in California after their marriage.
57
Upon reaching the age of 21, approximately three years after her marriage, Mackenzie attempted to register as a voter.
58 However, she was not allowed to register, because, the state argued, upon her marriage to a subject of Great Britain, she had ceased to be a citizen of the United States.
59
In an opinion less than three pages long, the Court readily dismissed Ethel Mackenzie's contention that Congress lacked power to deprive her of citizenship. 60 Instead, the Court consid- 62 The Court justified this discrimination, and the brevity of its opinion in denying relief to Ethel Mackenzie, citing an ancient principle, that of male dominance in a marriage:
[i]t would make this opinion very voluminous to consider in detail the argument and the cases urged in support of or in attack upon the opposing conditions. Their foundation principles, we may assume, are known. The identity of husband and wife is an ancient principle of our jurisprudence. It was neither accidental nor arbitrary and worked in many instances for her protection. There has been, it is true, much relaxation of it but in its retention as in its origin it is determined by their intimate relation and unity of interests, and this relation and unity may make it of public concern in many instances to merge their identity, and give dominance to the husband. It has purpose, if not necessity, in purely domestic policy; it has greater purpose and, it may be, necessity, in international policy. And this was the dictate of the act in controversy. Having this purpose, has it not the sanction of power? 63 Citizenship, the Court acknowledged, had "tangible worth," but the Court did not discuss what this "worth" might constitute and why entering into a marriage might compromise or diminish the value of citizenship to a woman but not to a man, particularly in a case in which the couple resided in the woman's country of origin.
64 Moreover, the Court did not explain why one's entitlement to citizenship is diminished or affected by marriage, except by reference to the need to "give dominance to the husband." 65 Perhaps it did not discuss the substance of citizenship in this case because, as in Minor, only suffrage was at issue. Since suffrage was not constitutionally necessary for women until passage of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920, to divest a woman of citizenship due to marriage, without proof of the woman's actual intent to divest, did not appear as problematic as if the circumstances were changed and Ethel Mackenzie was facing deportation as a nonci- 
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tizen. Notwithstanding this, it is ultimately citizenship that Ethel Mackenzie lost, not simply the vote. Moreover, the Court notes that "a change of citizenship cannot be arbitrarily imposed, that is, imposed without the concurrence of the citizen."
66 But it is an illusory consent that the Constitution required-Ethel Mackenzie had in effect "voluntarily" relinquished her citizenship by marrying a foreign national.
67
Despite the Court's adherence to a concept of marriage grounded in the woman's loss of personal identity, the Court, like the Minor v. Hapersett Court, ignores the role that a woman or mother plays in transmitting citizenship values to the children of the marriage. The Court does not discuss or consider the potential children of the Mackenzie marriage, their citizenship, and Ethel Mackenzie's role as primary caretaker and educator of her children. Any children of this marriage, if born in the United States, would have been American citizens by birth. Because the family resided in California, they would have been embedded in American culture. The Court, however, does not dwell on the strange family dynamic that it and Congress create; two noncitizen parents, one of them originally a native-born American citizen divested of her citizenship because of her decision to marry, raising American citizen children on American soil. The children of this family have more and better rights than either parent. Although the Court neglects these aspects of citizenship and the mother's role in parenting and educating her children, in the Mackenzie Court's view of the marital union, mothers, although subordinate to the father in the political arena, are primarily responsible for the care of the children. Since the father is relieved of primary responsibility for actual childcare, he is free to be active in public or political affairs, and to exercise political behavior like voting. Mothers, in this archaic view of the world, should have a primary role in instilling and developing citizenship values in children, although legitimately prohibited from living or practicing those values themselves.
Five years after the Mackenzie v. Hare decision, in 1920, the Nineteenth Amendment was adopted prohibiting the denial of the franchise on account of sex in the United States. 69 the Court stressed the value of the male parent in transferring citizenship. In Nguyen v. INS, on the other hand, little value is accorded the male parent and, theoretically, at least, the mother's role in birthing is glorified to an uncomfortably illusive level. 70 It may be that the act of giving birth itself may confer certain rights to prohibit government regulation of and interference with that parent-child relationship. The right at issue here, however, the right for a biological parent to transmit citizenship to his or her biological child, is at least as important to parents who raise the child or who exercise responsibility for the child, as to those who do not. Bellei, decided in 1971, reflects the Mackenzie view of sex and parenting.
Bellei is not a case that, on its facts, posed a sex or gender discrimination issue; it is a case in which the Court injected a note of sex discrimination. The case was brought by a young man, Aldo Bellei, born in Italy to an alien father and a U.S. citizen mother.
71
At the time, citizenship statutes required that a child of a U.S. citizen parent born abroad, whether mother or father, live continuously in the United States for a period of at least five years between the ages of fourteen and twenty-eight. 72 Failure to comply with the continuous residence requirement resulted in the child's loss of citizenship. 73 The United States treated Aldo Bellei as an American citizen from birth until he was twenty-four years of age when the United States Embassy in Italy refused to renew his passport and informed him that he was no longer considered a citizen. 74 The Court went on to hold that Congress had the power to place restrictions or conditions on derivative citizenship including a five-year period of continuous residence in the United States.
80
The Court applied a 'reasonableness' standard; that is, as long as the conditions on retention of citizenship are not "unreasonable, arbitrary, or unlawful," they withstood constitutional challenge.
81
The Court reasoned that dual citizenship posed a problem because the individual would be torn between two countries to which she or he owed allegiance.
82 Thus, the Court noted, requiring a period of residence for a nonresident citizen was reasonable and consistent with promoting dedicated attachment to the United States.
83
There are many problems with this decision, in particular, the idea that derivative citizenship is not protected by the Constitution to the same extent as birth-right citizenship or naturalized citizen- But it is the Court's injection of gender into a case that did not pose a gender issue on which I focus. The statute here did not differentiate between derivative citizenship passed through mothers and fathers. Regardless of whether the father or mother transferred citizenship, the child had to comply with the five-year continuous residence requirement.
87 Nevertheless, the Court, in upholding the statute, comes close to resting its decision on the fact that Aldo Bellei had derived his citizenship through his mother, rather than through his father. 88 The Court noted that prior to 1934, Congress had provided for derivative citizenship only for U.S. citizen fathers of children born abroad-maternal U.S. citizenship provided no benefit until 1934, so the Court ominously warned, had Bellei been born before 1934, he would have had no claim to citizenship at all.
89
Still, the Court reasoned, the fact that Bellei took his citizenship through his mother justified the continuous residence requirement and justified divesting him of citizenship involuntarily, even though the requirement was imposed by statute on children who derive their citizenship through either their father or their mother. 90 As the Court noted, [t] he Congress has an appropriate concern with problems attendant on dual nationality. . . . These problems are particularly acute when it is the father who is the child's alien parent and the father chooses to have his family reside in the country of his own nationality. The child is reared, at best, in an atmosphere of divided loyalty. We cannot say that a concern that the child's own primary allegiance is to the country of his birth and of his father's allegiance is either misplaced or arbitrary. 96 Nguyen, 208 F. 3d at 531. When the South Vietnamese fell, Tuan was in the care of Boulais's girlfriend's mother, as Boulais was out of the country. Tuan and his (eventually) step-grandmother fled Saigon with American assistance. His step-grandmother claimed to be Tuan's mother at the time of their evacuation. The facts of Tuan's birth and true parentage were never corrected in official records. Petitioner's Opening Brief at 5, Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, No. 98-60418 (Jan. 12, 1999) . 97 Nguyen, 208 F. 3d at 530 n.1; see also Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 85 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 98 Nguyen, 208 F. 3d at 532 (stating that Nguyen claimed to have citizenship by birth and noting that birth and naturalization are the only two sources of citizenship).
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In 1992 when Nguyen was twenty-two, he was convicted of two counts of sexual assault on a child and sentenced to eight years in prison on each count. 99 These offenses render a permanent resident alien deportable. 100 In the American legal system, deportations of noncitizens are civil proceedings.
101 These proceedings are entitled to little judicial review and aliens possess diminished constitutional rights in defending themselves against deportation. 103 The procedural history of the Nguyen case is instructive in conveying the labyrinthian, complex and confusing process deportation cases now follow in the American legal system. Only the most fantastic of legal fictions describes this process as due process. Nguyen was not represented by counsel at the hearing in which his deportability and citizenship status were initially determined. Aliens do not enjoy a constitutional right to counsel in a deportation hearing. Moreover, the deportation determination was made by a judge who lacks Article III status and serves directly under the Attorney General. 53 (2001) . Despite the fact that by the time the BIA decided the case Nguyen had submitted to the BIA the "Order of Parentage" from a Texas district court declaring Joseph Boulais to be Nguyen's father and declaring that "the parent-child relationship exists between the father and the child for all purposes," as well as the results of DNA testing, the BIA order dismissing Nguyen's appeal stated only that: "We note your claim that you are entitled to derivative United States citizenship. We observe that at your deportation hearing you admitted that you are a native of Vietnam. . . . Having admitted your foreign birth, you are presumed to be an alien. However, you failed to provide the Immigration Judge with evidence to support your citizenship claim. You have not sustained your burden of going forward with evidence establishing your claim of citizenship." Record supra note 95, at 62-63.
Nguyen filed a motion to reconsider with the BIA, which apparently has never been decided. Id. Concurrently, Nguyen filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court challenging the deportation order and the denial of relief from deportation and asking for a declaratory judgment on citizenship. Id. Nguyen also appealed the BIA's order of deportation to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Id. at 531-32. involving moral turpitude, and as an aggravated felon.
104 Before the immigration judge, Nguyen argued that he was a citizen of the United States because he was the son of a United States citizen.
105
The hearing was adjourned to allow Nguyen time to present evidence of citizenship.
106 At the second hearing, Nguyen's attorney withdrew. 107 The judge proceeded with the hearing with Nguyen unrepresented by counsel. 108 Nguyen testified at that hearing that he was not a citizen of the United States but was a citizen of Vietnam. 109 The immigration judge found him deportable. 110 Nguyen appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).
111 While the appeal to the BIA was pending, his father obtained an order of parentage from a state court, based on DNA testing. 112 The immigration appellate court denied Nguyen's appeal on the grounds that he was not a citizen because his father had failed to comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a), which provides for transmission of citizenship by birth to nonmarital children born abroad of U.S. citizen fathers and noncitizen-mothers. 113 Specifically, the BIA reasoned that Boulais had failed to legitimate their father-son relationship through some formal legal process prior to Nguyen's eighteenth birthday, as required by the statute. 114 Nguyen appealed his case to the federal courts, which anyone claiming American citizenship
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[Vol. 7:315 may do, 115 on the grounds that he was a United States' citizen, because, to the extent that the statute that granted derivative citizenship distinguished between the children of U.S. citizen mothers and U.S. citizen fathers and placed a more substantial burden on fathers than on mothers, the sex-based distinction violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
116
Under the statute, nonmarital foreign-born children of U.S. citizen mothers may claim derivative citizenship on the basis of a birth certificate identifying the U.S. citizen as the mother of the nonmarital child, as long as the mother was a U.S. citizen at the time of birth and as long as the mother had previously been physically present in the United States or one of its outlying possessions for a continuous period of at least one year. 117 The statute does not require that the mother have raised the child or have provided financial or other support to the child at any time after her or his birth.
U.S. citizens who are fathers of nonmarital foreign born children, however, are required, before the child reaches the age of eighteen, to take one of three affirmative steps, all of which require some form of legal process: legitimating, declaration of paternity under oath by the father, or court order of paternity. 
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tion, the statute requires that "a blood relationship between the person and the father is established by clear and convincing evidence," 119 and that "the father (unless deceased) has agreed in writing to provide financial support for the person until the person reaches the age of eighteen years."
120
The federal appellate court rejected Nguyen's appeal and the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.
121 A five-justice majority upheld the statute's distinction on the basis of sex finding that the challenged "classification served important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives."
122 The court identified two important governmental objectives: first, the importance of ensuring that a biological parent-child relationship exists between the U.S. citizen parent and the child claiming citizenship; 123 and second: the determination to ensure that the child and the citizen parent have some demonstrated opportunity or potential to develop not just a relationship that is recognized, as a formal matter, by the law, but one that consists of the real, everyday ties that provide a connection between child and citizen parent and, in turn, the United States.
124
Both of these interests were furthered by the sex differential, 
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NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:315 according to the court, because of the biological difference in actual birth between mothers and fathers. 125 As to the first interest, the Court stated that mothers and fathers are not similarly situated with regard to the proof of biological parenthood because the mother will always be at the birth itself.
126 As the Court noted, "[t]he mother's status is documented in most instances by the birth certificate or hospital records and the witnesses who attest to her having given birth," and giving birth is generally incontrovertible proof of the biological tie between mother and child. 127 The father, on the other hand, does not have to be present at the birth, and even if he is, his presence is "not incontrovertible proof of fatherhood." 128 Since they are not similarly situated vis à vis the proof of biological parenthood, there is no constitutional requirement that the government treat them similarly. To be sure, this is not a court looking toward the future of human biology and birth, not even considering the reality of assisted reproductive technology and how alternative human reproduction techniques might affect its concept of derivative citizenship.
129
Similarly, this Court is not interested in an actual blood-tie or "biological parenthood" whatever that term might mean, nor does it require that Congress be interested in an actual blood-tie between parent and child or actual biological parenthood. 130 Proof of birth from a nonmarital mother through birth certificates or other evidence of birth will suffice to establish the mother-child relation- REV. 247 (1999) . 130 The difficulties inherent in the concept of an actual blood-tie or "biological parenthood" today are demonstrated by the following fact pattern:
A female French citizen has a partner who is a dual citizen, American and Canadian, also a female. They have two children conceived by artificial insemination with anonymous sperm obtained through a California clinic. Both children were born in Canada and were carried by a dual American-Canadian citizen. Both children have the same biological father, but one of the children is biologically a descendant of the French mother who has provided her eggs for in vitro fertilization. In other words, one child is the biological descendant of two American citizens, the other child is the biological descendant of an American father whose identity is unknown, a biological mother who is French but who was carried by an American citizen up to birth. Can that child claim U.S. citizenship? The author thanks Professor Stephen Legomsky for providing this fact pattern.
ship at any time the child wishes to claim citizenship; but not so for the child born abroad of a U.S. citizen nonmarital father.
Moreover, in the view of this Court, both mothers and fathers appear to be typified by the worst in human sexual behavior patterns-both males and females apparently are prone to promiscuous and irresponsible sexual behavior, inevitably, apparently, leading to childbirth. Women and mothers, in particular, are prone to lies and deception about their sexual behavior to their sexual partner. The image of an expectant father at a birth event who is not really the father because the mother has tricked him or, worse, does not know the identity of the real father, is a powerful and accurate image in the eyes of this Supreme Court majority.
As to the second interest, ensuring an opportunity for a meaningful relationship between the parent and child that will facilitate transmission of American culture and values, the Court notes that again the biological difference between mothers and fathers of children born overseas justifies the difference in treatment. 131 In the case of the mother, the Court notes: the opportunity for a meaningful relationship between citizen parent and child inheres in the very event of birth, an event so often critical to our constitutional and statutory understandings of citizenship. The mother knows that the child is in being and is hers and has an initial point of contact with him. There is at least an opportunity for mother and child to develop a real, meaningful relationship.
132
In the case of the unwed father, however, the same opportunity does not result from the birth. The father may not know that a child was conceived; or similarly, the mother may not even know the father's identity. 133 After all, the Court implies, most of these children are likely to be the children of military, most of whom are male and young and apparently, in the view of this Court, extremely promiscuous and irresponsible, more so than the average American man and woman.
134 Moreover, the Court notes:
When we turn to the conditions which prevail today, we find that the passage of time has produced additional and even more substantial grounds to justify the statutory distinction. The ease of travel and the willingness of Americans to visit foreign countries have resulted in numbers of trips abroad that must be of real concern when we contemplate the prospect of accepting
340
NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:315 petitioners' argument, which would mandate, contrary to Congress' wishes, citizenship by male parentage subject to no condition save the father's previous length of residence in this country. In 1999 alone, Americans made almost 25 million trips abroad, excluding trips to Mexico. . . . Visits to Canada and Mexico add to this figure almost 34 million additional visits. . . . And the average American overseas traveler spent 15.1 nights out of the United States in 1999.
135
The Court does not do the arithmetic, but the implication of these numbers is clear: a potential fifty-nine million U.S. citizen children born abroad each year-and if the traveler is a male, the number may increase by fourteen children per traveler per year! "Principles of equal protection do not require Congress to ignore this reality," the Court concludes.
136
The majority opinion emphasizes biological differences, but, as the dissent points out, this case is not about biological differences, but about fairly broad and overdrawn stereotypes that bear almost no similarity or relationship to the case before the Court, or to the actual behavior patterns of most American women or men.
137 Thus, the statute imposes a gender differential on the basis of gender stereotypes about males and females-men as irresponsible, promiscuous sexual predators and women either as more responsible, nurturing parents whose bonding with the child at birth is likely to ensure a meaningful relationship with the child (whether the mother ever sees the child again or not), or as willing participants in promiscuous and irresponsible sex, so much so that she or he will never be sure who a child's father really is.
The Court's view of the statutory difference between nonmarital mothers and fathers reflects still another stereotypethat anyone who engages in sex outside marriage is promiscuous and irresponsible. But if this is the stereotype behind Congress's statutory requirements for derivative citizenship in the case of nonmarital children, it would justify similar treatment of the sexes, not differential treatment.
Perhaps, as well, the differential reflects the view that U.S. mothers of nonmarital children born abroad are more likely to return with their children to the United States than U.S. fathers, because, as a general matter, mothers are more likely than fathers to retain primary caretaker or custodial status over their marital or 135 Id. at 66. 136 Id. 137 Id. at 74-97 (2001) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) . See also Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 460-471 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) . nonmarital children. 138 This difference in parenting roles, however, that men and women tend to or are expected to play is at the heart of gender stereotypes. It is the difference that the Minor Court used to deny Virginia Minor the vote and another woman, Myra Bradwell, a license to practice law.
139 It is a difference that has been eliminated for the most part in American family law. It is a difference that, at heart, has nothing to do with sex or gender but with the exercise of parental responsibility. 140 The statutory sexbased distinction does not just make it easier for nonmarital children of U.S. citizen mothers to establish derivative citizenship; it also imposes a substantial burden on the U.S. citizen father that if not fulfilled prohibits him from passing on citizenship to his nonmarital children born abroad.
The Court's opinion strains to find a substantial relationship between the difference in treatment between the sexes and the goal it says Congress is trying to achieve-ensuring that an opportunity for a parent-child relationship during a child's formative years exists. Its attempt to do so, however, is unconvincing. The Court appears to be saying that the fact that a woman has carried a child until birth provides an opportunity for a meaningful relationship to form between mother and child that a father will not have because fathers do not physically carry children. Bearing the child, however, does not provide an opportunity to transmit values. It
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[Vol. 7:315 may make sense for Congress to require a parent-child relationship that facilitates an education in and appreciation of, American history, culture and values for transmission of citizenship. But to contend that the period of time a fetus spends in the uterus and the period of time spent in actual birth is material to transmission of citizenship strains credulity. It is the period of time after birth, during a child's formative years, that is material for transmission of values. With respect to this period of time, the nonmarital father is in a similar position toward forming or developing a relationship with his child, at least in theory, as the nonmarital mother. Further, the amount of time a fetus spends in the uterus is the same for both marital and nonmarital children. Let us assume that because the law presumes that children born in a marriage are fathered by the male spouse of the marriage (regardless of actual blood-tie or biological parentage), it is rational to treat marital and nonmarital children differently. The difference in treatment would be rational because the marital father bears parental responsibility for the child as a matter of law. Both marital fathers and mothers, thus, are similarly situated with respect to their marital children. With regard to nonmarital children, it makes sense, then, to require that a parent transmitting citizenship to a child bear legal responsibility for the child. The statute challenged in Nguyen may have reflected an attempt by Congress to ensure that, in the case of nonmarital children, only parents who financially supported and cared for their children received the benefit of transmitting U.S. citizenship. Although such a scheme may be faulted for failing to take into account the interests of the child, if applied to both mothers and fathers, it would be a reasonable way of distinguishing between marital and nonmarital children. But the Nguyen statute does not draw that distinction. Instead, it relies on old and tired stereotypes about men and women and their respective relationships to children, requiring responsible parenting by men but not by women. Moreover, the opinion, taken as a whole, emphasizes the "minimal" nature of the burden the statute places on the father. But requiring an individual to engage in some kind of formal legal process, when such legal process is actually unnecessary to care for a child and enjoy custody over that child, is not a minimal burden. The Court dismisses the fact that the father may not even know of the statutory requirements for derivative citizenship until after deportation proceedings have begun. To describe the statutory requirements imposed on the father as opposed to the mother (upon whom no burdens are imposed other than giving birth to
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the child) as posing a minimal burden is facile. At no point in the Nguyen opinion does the Court indicate any awareness that the stereotypes on which its reasoning rests are flatly contradicted by the actual facts of the case before it; it is as if Joseph Boulais and Tuan Anh Nguyen are not before the Court at all.
141
Missing in this opinion, as in all the other opinions discussed, is a coherent and clear concept of what citizenship is or might be, and how relationships, including family relationships, may affect citizenship. The Court remains unwilling to articulate a vision or concept of citizenship informed by constitutional principles. This unwillingness to articulate a concept of citizenship does not mean that the Court's opinions fail to convey a vision of citizenship, rather, it is simply an undeveloped vision lacking consistency, coherence and meaning for society.
This omission is most glaring in the Court's characterization of the interests that the government seeks to vitiate in the statute. The Court characterizes the government's interests to ensure that there is a blood relationship between the parent and the nonmarital child, and to ensure that there is an opportunity for a meaningful relationship between the U.S. citizen parent and the child born abroad. 142 The first interest, the blood relationship, is the determinative factor in derivative citizenship. Citizenship by blood traditionally furnished the basis for transmission of citizenship. The problem, of course, is that in both the case of the nonmarital mother and nonmarital father, the best evidence of the blood relationship may be DNA testing, not a birth certificate or a legitimating process.
It is the second interest, to ensure a meaningful relationship between parent and child, which creates the more substantial problem with the statutory scheme and the Court's treatment of that scheme. The Court stresses the importance of the opportunity to form a meaningful relationship between parent and child and neglects to explore whether the real interest that could or should be pursued is whether there has been a meaningful parent-child rela-141 Cf. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) . Constitutional adjudication rests on the idea that the Court is in the best posture to decide challenges to governmental action when persons with much to lose have actually had those interests affected. Presumably, the record developed in such a case is to be of use or service to the Court in explaining why the statute is or is not constitutionally problematic. The Nguyen Court ignores the facts of the case; its discussion and reasoning is unaffected and completely removed from the actual factual circumstances that have given rise to the claim. 142 One vision of citizenship in the context of gender that is based on an honest and realistic measure of each individual's potential and abilities is that presented in the case of the United States v. Virginia.
144
VMI was decided in 1996. The case does not appear to involve citizenship at all. Thus, I may be accused of injecting citizenship notions into a case having nothing to do with it, in the same way that I have criticized the Bellei Court for injecting gender into a case that does not raise the issue at all. Like the Bellei Court, I will live with that criticism.
The VMI case involved a challenge to the Virginia Military Institute's single-sex admissions policy on the grounds that the school's male-only policy discriminated on the basis of sex in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
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In perhaps the strongest opinion on gender discrimination issued by the Supreme Court, Justice Ginsburg acknowledged Virginia's aim in its single-sex policy:
VMI's distinctive mission is to produce "citizen-soldiers," men prepared for leadership in civilian life and in military service. VMI pursues this mission through pervasive training of a kind not available anywhere else in Virginia. Assigning prime place to character development, VMI uses an "adversative method" modeled on English public schools and once characteristic of military instruction. VMI constantly endeavors to instill physical and mental discipline in its cadets and impart to them a strong moral code. The school's graduates leave VMI with heightened comprehension of their capacity to deal with duress and stress, and a large sense of accomplishment for completing the hazardous course.
146
But, as the lower Court had noted, "neither the goal of producing citizen-soldiers nor VMI's implementing methodology is inherently unsuitable to women."
147 Therefore, the Court concluded, the single-sex policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
148 Both the Nguyen and VMI courts applied the same test to determine whether the gender differential violated norms of equality; the way the two courts applied the test, however, is substantially different. Both opinions state that governmental distinctions on the basis of sex must not be based on overbroad generalizations about men and women, but instead must be based on real differences between the sexes. 149 The Nguyen Court's view of a real difference, however, is hard to understand as anything other than gross cultural stereotypes about female and male behavior patterns. For the Nguyen Court, the behavior of a few members of either sex will doom every member of the group to be tainted by whatever characteristic the Court deems to be "representative" of the group.
The Nguyen Court sought to mask its reliance on overbroad stereotypes about the sexes by its continued insistence that it was biological differences, in its view real differences, that justified the difference in treatment. As explained by Justice Ginsburg, however, "[t]he justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation. And it must not rely on trict court's findings that some women, like some men, are capable of all of the individual activities required of VMI cadets. 160 Moreover, the Court noted, "the parties agree that some women can meet the physical standards VMI now imposes on men." 161 In fact, the Court had evidence before it that indicated that approximately ten percent of women would be able to meet the physical standards VMI imposed on men.
162 Thus, the fact that a particular stereotype or generalization might hold true for "most" women, did not justify exclusion of all women from the program. 163 Similarly, it was not material that more men than women may pursue and be successful at VMI; rather the question the Court identified is "whether [Virginia] can constitutionally deny to women who have the will and capacity, the training and attendant opportunities that VMI uniquely affords."
164
The Court rejected the argument that exclusion of women is essential to preserving the character and mission of the VMI program. As Justice Ginsburg wrote:
VMI's mission: to produce "citizen-soldiers," individuals imbued with love of learning, confident in the functions and attitudes of leadership, possessing a high sense of public service, advocates of the American democracy and free enterprise system, and ready to defend their country in time of national peril. . . . Surely that goal is great enough to accommodate women, who today count as citizens in our American democracy equal in stature to men.
165
Setting aside for the moment whether the VMI vision of "citizenship" is a particularly good one, it is at least a vision of citizenship that requires actual equality in the sense of affording all the opportunity to participate in the endeavor. It is a vision that does not mask differences; it acknowledges them but does not make more of them than is warranted. The VMI decision upholds a vision of equality that does not guarantee that everyone will have access to the resources, only that one will have the opportunity for access on the strength of one's abilities. The VMI opinion celebrates the individual-what it guarantees is that one is to be treated as an individual and not as a member of the group, particularly when the group stereotype is a negative stereotype used by the state to deny an indi- 
A. Globalization, Gender, and International Law
Globalization is inevitable. It will not obscure differences. It may be shaped, however, and we should be actively involved in its shaping.
As Peter Singer notes in the preface to his recent book on globalization, One World, in the aftermath of September 11, the war against Iraq and, now, the post-Iraq war, exploring the concept of globalization appears strained. 166 Plainly, today, the world appears divided, whether or not it is actually more divided than at any other time in the past.
But as Professor Singer notes in the context of September 11 and America's response to the attack: confirms rather than denies the idea of a world that is increasingly becoming one, for it shows that no country, however mighty, is invulnerable to deadly force from the far corners of the earth. An American administration that had previously shown little concern for the opinion of the rest of the world found itself in need of the cooperation of other nations in a global campaign against terrorism.
167
It really is one world, and it always has been one world. Environmental science, technology, and travel have made us more aware of our interconnectedness, but few of us, knowingly or not, go through our lives without interacting or being affected by persons, events, or things that are outside our local area of residence. It may perhaps be most obvious in the context of the environment and biology and our own susceptibility to germs, bacteria, and disease, but events that occur in one part of the world have and have always had an effect on other parts of the world. Thus, while differences in cultures, values, religion, language, attitudes, politics and economies remain stark, we will continue to have to deal with each other.
Globalization exposes the tensions inherent in concepts of citizenship, particularly for states that treat citizenship as material to the issue of human rights. Basic human rights, like freedom from 166 SINGER, supra note 33. 167 Id. at ix.
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gender discrimination, should not depend on citizenship status.
168
One lesson we have learned from the American experience, from the German experience, from the formation of the European Union, is that for a society or civilization to thrive, each individual member residing in the community has to be guaranteed basic human rights. 169 Whether these rights are inherent in humanity or whether they are derived from some other source is immaterial to the idea that all individuals are entitled to some set of rights. In the context of the United States, the fifty states may provide different legal norms, benefits, and protections to their residents, but the plain language of the Constitution guarantees to all persons in the country the protection of their basic human rights.
Globalization poses a challenge for legal adherence to and enforcement of gender equality norms. Feminist writers and commentators have warned that gender is a problem in the context of globalization, but their admonishment remains unincorporated into mainstream diplomatic and political structures. 170 That approach is dangerous. Gender stereotypes still play too predominant a role in Western societies for silence on the issue of gender equality in a global context. Adherence to norms of gender equality must be as important a part of the discussion on globalization as other human rights, the environment, trade, labor, the economy, and public health.
Presently, in the United States, constitutional limits generally prohibit governmental discrimination on the basis of sex. Nguyen's approach is likely to be limited to the immigration and naturalization context, in which the Court traditionally has adopted a highly
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[Vol. 7:315 deferential posture to Congressional and executive exercises of powers. 171 Notwithstanding, it is a symbol of perhaps more meaningful protections against discrimination on the basis of sex are secured by federal statutes. 172 States and municipalities also extend some protection to persons who have been injured by gender bias. 173 The federal enforcement scheme, while imperfect, is stronger than perhaps in any other nation. As with labor, environmental, and health concerns, it behooves our legal and governmental institutions to partake in the international dialogue to secure global acceptance and enforcement of gender equality norms.
A recent period of residency in Greece on a Fulbright grant, allowed me to explore normative and enforcement commitment to gender equality in a different setting. Greece is a predominantly homogeneous society with a rich historical and cultural tradition that in modern times merges elements of Western and Middle Eastern civilizations. 174 Like many of its European counterparts, Greece is a small country. Its total population of almost eleven million is spread out over mountainous, dry, rocky, and arid territory consisting, in part, of 1,400 islands.
175
American scholars think of Greece in the context of ancient Greece and what ancient Greek philosophers contributed to the modern world: the development of democracy, a conception of equality, 176 and, more recently, a conception of sex and gender
